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The 2000;2001 financial crisis in Turkey is one among many crises that characterize the current international financial system (Eichengreen, 2001) . While this crisis has generated a vast literature discussing its causes 1 , comparatively little attention is paid to its effects. This paper remedies this neglect by examining the differential impacts of the Turkish crisis on capital and labor through an analysis of economic indicators, a review of institutional and structural changes, and various pivotal policy choices. Instead of an abstract general theory or a predominantly statistical analysis (for examples of the latter, see Diwan (2000 Diwan ( , 2001 , Jayadev (2005) , or Onaran (2007)), we emphasize the analysis of the political processes and various economic tendencies at work in a country beset by a financial crisis.
In general, we find that the consequences of the Turkish financial crisis of 2000;2001 were largely beneficial to capital, to the detriment of workers. Amongst capitalists, the impacts of the crisis differed for both international and domestic capital, as well as financial and industrial capital. We largely focus on the impacts for international capital, which was able to increase its total asset base in the economy as well as the income flow it receives.
However, large domestic financial capital also managed to increase its profits in the aftermath of the crisis, and domestic industrial capital benefited insofar as real wages were reduced and the power of the labor movement declined (although it appears to have been hurt by the crisis in other respects). Finally, a number of consequences ensued from the structural changes imposed after the financial crisis, most of which were generally beneficial for capital. These reforms were broadly in line with the Washington Consensus: an acceleration of the privatization process, an increased regressive taxation, Central Bank independence, a [virtually exclusive] focus on inflation, increasing flexibility in labor markets, the liberalization of the agricultural sector, and so on.
Of course, labor and capital are not homogeneous entities, thus the benefits and costs of the Turkish financial crisis differed according to various characteristics of both capital and labor. Our examination of the consequences of the crisis for capital largely focuses on the impacts on 'international capital', by which we mean capitalists which operate on a world;scale, including international financial capital and multinational and transnational firms. Of course, international capital does not always cooperate, have the same interests, or gain equally from crisis situations, but we do not attempt a detailed breakdown of their potentially divergent interests. "Domestic financial capital" and "domestic industrial capital" (collectively referred to as domestic capital) are analyzed broadly, although these concepts are refined where the impact of the crisis differs between sub;sections of domestic capital and can be empirically distinguished. The relationship between domestic capital and its international counterpart is complex and contradictory -at times they are in competition (such as when domestic firms cohabit with multinationals in a given market), and sometimes they share common interests (in terms of their relationship with the working class, for example). Some specific capitalists may arguably be both domestic in some respects and international in others.
Just as we use broad categories for capital, we do not distinguish between various groups of workers, despite the likelihood that different strata within the working class have different interests. In Turkey, the differences between formal and informal; and public and private employment could be particularly important. 2 Similarly, we do not analyze the situation of peasants or the rural sector in any detail.
We view the state as a locus of struggles, as each of these groups pursues its preferred policy options. Our analysis of the consequences of the crisis assesses both the extent to which the Turkish state lost its autonomy vis;à;vis international capital and other creditors and the extent to which it favored one domestic group or the other. While this first objective may sometimes give a nationalistic flavor to the argument, we are only concerned with the ability of the state to mediate the interests of domestic classes relative to those of foreign entities.
Finally, we see the IMF as being broadly allied to international capital, given their strong commonality of views, the revolving door between the Fund and international financial institutions, the degree to which the IMF's support of the Washington Consensus is advantageous to international capital, and the likelihood that the IMF sides directly with international capital in periods of financial crisis (e.g., Bhagwati, 1998; Stiglitz, 2002; Wade, 1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998) . To the extent that policymaking retains some importance within the current international financial system, the influence of the IMF on domestic policy choices makes it an important structural component of that system.
While our analysis concerns Turkey, we believe that several of our conclusions may have a large degree of generality. The way in which the Turkish government has embraced policies benefiting international capital, as well as the role played by the IMF, appears instructive. Moreover, not only is labor disproportionately harmed by the crisis, but it is also attacked on multiple fronts through various governmental policies, revealing that there is some degree of agency involved in addition to impersonal economic processes. Overall, the varied dimensions through which international capital may gain from the Turkish crisis suggests that crises play a supportive role in the current capitalist system and that international capital may profit from them. This is consistent with the argument that current international financial arrangements should be viewed as a form of 'new imperialism': the creation of conditions that enable international capital to increase its wealth and power over developing economies Lévy, 2003 and Harvey, 2003) . Duménil & Lévy (2006) and Crotty & Lee (2001) provide vivid case studies of this new imperialism in Argentina and South Korea, while Ruccio (1991) argues that new imperialism is facilitated by stabilization policies. Similarly, Yeldan (2007) argues that the Turkish economy has been placed under the control of agents of new imperialism in the post;crisis era. Wade (1998) , Wade & Veneroso (1998), and Stiglitz (2002) offer a scathing indictment of the degree to which governments of leading industrialized countries as well as the IMF act on behalf of international capital. Several empirical studies suggest that international financial crises hurt labor disproportionately (e.g. Diwan, 2000 Diwan, , 2001 Jayadev, 2005; Onaran, 2007) .
The 1990s were unstable times for the Turkish economy. Following the capital account liberalization in 1989, Turkey experienced a 'boom;bust' cycle with annual growth oscillating between 9.3 percent and ;5.5 percent of GDP. Average growth rates were low, annual inflation was above 60 percent for the entire decade (sometimes reaching more than 80 percent), and the government ran large budget deficits (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003) . Rather than easing government borrowing, capital account liberalization forced the government to offer higher spreads relative to the dollar assets which were freely availably following liberalization. Real interest rates on government debt soared; creating arbitrage opportunities for private banks to exploit the difference between the high rates on government securities compared to foreign borrowing and domestic deposits (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003 (IMF, 1999a) . The government also pledged to keep capital flows free from any restriction and to refrain from intensifying trade restrictions (IMF 1999a (IMF , 1999b .
The government announced it would curtail spending via a reduction in labor costs and a reform of social programs; wages of public sector employees were to be frozen in real terms, while the financing and accessibility of important social programs, such as social security, was cut (IMF, 1999b) .
In contrast with the efforts to attain budgetary balance, however, banking laws were amended to force the Savings Deposits Insurance Fund (SDIF) 4 to recover any insolvent banks for restructuring or liquidation, while it was forbidden to provide liquidity to any bank not under its full control (IMF 1999b) . Following some financial disruptions on the eve of the financial crisis, the SDIF was given full authority to borrow as needed from the Treasury and full protection was even granted to the creditors and depositors of domestic deposit;
taking banks (IMF 2000c) , ostensibly to restore confidence in the program. These two measures would eventually prove so costly that they exceeded the savings garnered from restraint on the fiscal front, including the large revenues from privatization. Thus while social spending and public wages were capped, investors were guaranteed full reimbursement for any loss incurred.
The stabilization program was implemented starting in December 1999. The program was framed around a crawling peg designed to move with anticipated inflation, and it rapidly experienced strains as price increases outpaced expectations. However, virtually every other target was met, and both government officials and IMF staff proclaimed they were satisfied with the program's progress (IMF, 2000a (IMF, , 2000b and Turkey earned praise from international financial analysts for its stabilization policies. Nonetheless, the currency kept appreciating in real terms and signs of trouble eventually culminated in a flight from the currency in November. The last week of November alone witnessed a $5.3 billion outflow as a result of short;term speculative operations, causing a severe liquidity shortage in domestic financial markets and sending overnight interest rates as high as 2,000 percent. The outflow of capital was halted and devaluation fears allayed only after the IMF granted $7.5 billion in additional support (Yeldan, 2002 Orhangazi, 2002) . In the aftermath of the February crisis, inflation started increasing again, government debt as a percentage of GDP had nearly doubled, and interest rates were still high (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003) .
Without attempting a complete assessment of the IMF program, it is evident that it failed to achieve its stated purposes: to reduce inflation, real interest rates, and government debt. Moreover, the crisis occurred in the context of an absence of any controls on capital flows, during a privatization drive, with tight fiscal policies, a state commitment to take over any bank becoming insolvent, as well as an implicit guarantee on the loans made to domestic banks. This policy environment affected the outcome of the crisis to a great extent.
International capital emerged largely unscathed from the crisis, thanks to protections introduced that guaranteed foreign investments at public expense. In fact, international capital increased its assets, notably via foreign direct investment and external debt, which subsequently increased income repatriated from Turkey. Moreover, while a number of domestic banks went insolvent during the crisis, their losses were also covered by the public.
Large domestic banks even benefited from the crisis thanks to increased interest income.
Finally, following the crisis, the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (CBRT) sought to deter future instability by accumulating greater foreign exchange reserves, which created an additional burden that indirectly benefited international capital.
The IMF stabilization program included a crawling peg designed to devalue the currency in line with targeted inflation. As inflation targets were unattained, the Turkish Lira became increasingly overvalued during 2000 (IMF 2000a, c) . This encouraged Turkish banks to increase their short;term external debt by about 28 percent in 2000 (IMF, 2000b (IMF, , 2000c Akyüz & Boratav, 2003) , despite serious attempts by the state to restrict external borrowing, notably through high reserve requirements for external positions exceeding a preset ceiling.
By the end of 2000, the total external debt was 59 percent of GDP, compared to 47 percent only two years before.
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Heavy foreign borrowing in search of short;term arbitrage gains arguably contributed to the flight from the currency in November 2000 and the February crisis.
However, the stabilization program had included amendments to banking laws that prevented the provision of liquidity to distressed banks. Thus the government was forced to wait until financial institutions were technically insolvent before taking action (IMF, 1999b) .
These legal restrictions, as well as a new law protecting creditors and depositors of deposit; taking banks, forced the government to take over several troubled banking institutions and assume the entirety of their liabilities. Since a large portion of the liabilities of these distressed banks was denominated in dollars, the government was obliged to borrow heavily abroad to honor its commitments. According to a report by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency of Turkey (BDDK), the government spent $47.2 billion to bail out the Turkish financial system, including $25.3 billion to rescue private banks (BDDK 2003) . While most of this increase in total external debt was public external debt 5 , this is in large part a result of the nationalization of private debt via the bank bailouts.
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While it offered an arbitrage opportunity for investors who bid against the currency, the devaluation itself was very costly to the government. The day before the devaluation, the government sold $5 billion to banks at the lower exchange rate (CBRT). Interest rates rose to triple digits while the government fought to maintain the peg, thereby increasing the implicit and explicit liabilities of the government and the strain on private institutions.
Overall, the crisis led the government to borrow an amount equivalent to 17 percent of GNP, an increase of 66 percent in its foreign liabilities (Table 1) . A large portion of these funds came from the IMF (Figure 1 ), including an unprecedented loan of almost 9 billion SDRs. In that year alone, the amount owed by the government to multilateral agencies nearly doubled, increasing from $11.4 billion to $22 billion (CBRT).
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This large increase in foreign indebtedness drained domestic resources for debt repayment and interest charges. The level and duration of the commitment is illustrated in Table 1 , which presents the total level of debt servicing costs in terms of GNP, and Figures 1, 2, and 3, which focus on the public debt situation. The total cost of external debt servicing reached 17 percent of GNP following the crisis and still exceeded pre;crisis levels three years later (Table 1) . Total interest charges on the public debt actually surpassed tax revenues in 2001, an increase of more than twenty percent from the previous year (Figure 3) . 6 This debt service burden is a long;term economic drag: five years after the crisis the interest charges paid to the IMF still have not diminished (Figures 1 and 2) . What is more, it was incurred largely to reimburse foreign financial institutions through the bailout of the domestic institutions that had borrowed from them. This shifted the entire cost of this foreign indebtedness on the domestic population at large.
Perhaps more importantly, Turkey was effectively pushed into debt peonage. The burden of international debt commitments provides the IMF and other important international creditors with leverage vis;à;vis government policymakers, both at the moment the money is lent and as long as the debt overhang persists. In this case, there indeed seems to have been a loss of government autonomy, which along with the large interest burden, effectively came in large part in exchange for a bail out of international capital. 7 It would be hard for international capitalists to ask for a better deal. One of the ways in which this loss in autonomy seems to have played out is through the quick enactment of laws that considerably reduced the risk borne by international capital when the stabilization program started experiencing troubles in November 2000. Specifically, the full guarantee of loans made to
Turkish banks, combined with the necessity for the SDIF to take over any insolvent bank (IMF, 1999c (IMF, , 2000c , amounted to a nationalization of the debt of all financial institutions facing the risk of being unable to service it. An IMF country report prepared in the aftermath of the crisis praised the government for putting the governmental guarantee on private banks' liabilities on 'firmer legal grounds' (IMF 2001b: 16) . Consequently, these loans became risk free and the entire cost of the adjustment in domestic financial markets was shifted to the domestic population. The only way international capital could lose was via its portfolio and direct investments, which were not given the same level of protection. We show the overall gain in these sectors below.
These developments had mixed impacts on domestic capitalists. In some respects, they benefited from policies forced on Turkey thanks to the leverage that international capital held over the government. But while some legal and policy changes clearly benefited domestic capitalists, some of which we review in sections 4 and 5 below, other developments may have been less favorable. For example, restrictions on foreign investment were eased in various sectors at a moment when domestic capital was not in a good position to compete. The fact that the portion of the banking sector owned by foreigners went from being marginal before the crisis to 38.8 percent in 2006 (CBRT 2007: 27) may be a direct result of the timing of these policy changes.
Increased economic fragility together with a financial crisis creates opportunities for international capital to penetrate the domestic economy. Otherwise solvent companies experiencing temporary problems may be forced to liquidate some of their assets at relatively low prices. Similarly, the disarray in domestic financial markets may put local companies at a disadvantage compared to the affiliates of multinationals, whose relationship with the parent firm gives them more reliable access to credit. 8 Via direct acquisition of assets or the expansion of the activities of existing affiliates, the financial crisis could offer international capital the occasion to take a greater hold of the economy.
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As has been the case in other financial crisis (Duménil & Lévy, 2003; Harvey, 2003; Wade & Veneroso, 1998) To manage risks associated with these volatile capital flows, countries are routinely advised to set aside in their reserves an amount equal to their short;term foreign;denominated loans. To see what this implies, assume that a firm in a small developing country accepts a short;term $100 million loan from an American bank, paying 18 percent interest. Prudential policy on the part of the country would require that it would add $100 million to reserves. Typically reserves are held in US Treasury bills, which recently paid around 4 percent. In effect, the country is simultaneously borrowing from the United States at 18 percent and lending to the United States at 4 percent. The country as a whole has no more resources available for investing. American banks may make a tidy profit and the United
States as a whole gains $16 million a year in interest. But it is hard to see how this allows the developing country to grow faster. Put this way, it clearly makes no sense. There is a further problem: a mismatch of incentives. With capital market liberalization, it is firms in a country's private sector that get to decide whether to borrow short;term funds from American banks, but it is the government that must accommodate itself, adding to its reserves if it wishes to maintain its prudential standing.
Hence reserves act as an insurance policy, for which Turkey pays a fee to the issuer of the reserve currency. As such, it gives issuers of reserve currencies an interest in the perpetuation of systemic instability to compel 'developing' countries to continue to accumulate reserves. Thus governments of industrialized countries have a common interest with international capital insofar as both benefit from the consequences of international financial instability. Added to the fact that international capital has vast resources to lobby these governments and that public officials often come from its midst, this may explain why they often adopt policy stances which seem in line with the interests of international capital (Wade, 1998; Wade & Veneroso, 1998) . . This is not to say that there were no problems in the sector -FDI patterns suggest that at least some firms were ripe for acquisition. In fact, the increase in repatriated profits shows that foreign capitalists benefited from the recovery, either via the firms they owned directly or their partnerships with domestic corporations.
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The 2000;01 crisis imposed a heavy burden of adjustment. Economic activity slowed down considerably, the financial system was disrupted, and the crisis itself proved very onerous for the government. While some sectors -such as bank creditors -fared well, the burden of adjustment appears to have been borne largely by workers and the beneficiaries of social programs. The taxation system became increasingly regressive and the real wages and the labor share decreased markedly after the crisis ( Figure 10 and Table 2 ). All in all, we find that the crisis shifted the balance power in favor of capital. This case is not unique in this respect;
there is increasing evidence that financial crises generally hit labor more harshly than capital (Diwan 2000 (Diwan , 2001 Jayadev, 2005) .
The changes in real wages and the labor share around the time of the crisis are symptomatic of the shift in the balance of power between labor and capital. The difficult post;crisis economic conditions, such as an unemployment rate that exceeded 10 percent following the crisis and stayed at that level afterwards (Table 2) , gave capitalists a lever to undercut labor's bargaining power. At the same time, the government cut the wages of public employees and froze the real wages of civil servants (IMF, 1999b) . These policies and the increasing unemployment both reflected a worsening of workers' fall;back options. An active income policy to reduce wages was also implemented in the aftermath of the crisis (IMF, 2001b, p. 21) . This policy was carried out under the euphemism of "strengthened social dialogue to promote wage moderation and social protection" (IMF, 2001b, p. 21) .
Meanwhile, organized labor was also losing ground. The number of unionized workers decreased by about one;sixth in 2001 alone, after having been on an upward trend for the preceding five years ( Table 2) (Figure 8 ). Five years after the fact, the government still owes over $23 billions to these institutions. These funds were urgently needed at the time they were borrowed, thus as lender of last resort the IMF had considerable leverage vis;à;vis the government's policy agenda. It was in this context of cooperation with the IMF throughout the crisis that the government nationalized the debt of all the insolvent banks while maintaining the country's complete openness to capital flows.
After the crisis, the implementation of the policies contained in the stabilization program was to be sped up and further neoliberal reforms were introduced.
<FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE>
Prior to the crisis, the IMF was dissatisfied with the pace of privatization. The only major privatization that had occurred before the crisis was in the telecommunications industry, and even this one had only been partial ( Figure 9 ). The IMF believed that "slippages had emerged, partly because of market conditions, partly because of delays and less than a full commitment to privatize" (IMF, 2001, p. 17) . Following the crisis, the new privatization strategy envisaged a "stronger effort on the side of the authorities to put Turkey in the best position to privatize its public enterprises" (ibid.). This 'effort' included the full privatization of Turk Telekom, sale of the state monopolies in sugar, tobacco, and gas sectors, the sale of Turkish Airlines, ERDEMIR (steel), and TUPRAS (petroleum refineries); and a privatization of the companies responsible for the generation and distribution of electricity (IMF, 2001b, pp. 17, 60) . The state also expressed a will to attract more FDI in conjunction with this privatization effort (IMF, 2001b, pp. 17, 60) (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003) . As some other objectives ostensibly trumped debt reduction, the discourse evolved and efficiency considerations, rather than government financing needs, came to be cited as justification for privatization (e.g., IMF, 2001a),
suggesting that privatization was in fact an end in itself.
Government spending grew in large part thanks to the $47.2 billion bailout of the financial system. Social spending and labor costs in the public sector were reduced, indicating that the government prioritized spending on financial creditors rather than their less affluent counterparts. It will be difficult to reinstate social spending, since debt servicing costs currently absorb a very large portion of tax revenues (Figure 3 ). Taxes We do not wish to suggest that there is a unilateral relationship of subservience between the IMF and the government. What we argue is that the crisis has given leverage to certain entities, notably the IMF, which has allowed them more power in the contested field of policymaking. This resulted in the establishment of policies that were both largely neoliberal in their thrust and advantageous to capitalists and affluent groups in general.
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While there has been much written on the Turkish financial crisis of 2000;01, this literature has been mostly centered on the underlying determinants of the crisis. Here we shift the debate to focus on the consequences of the crisis rather than its roots. In doing so, we argue that capital benefited in the aftermath of the crisis, while labor was disadvantaged. We found that international capital benefited from the crisis by increasing its total assets in the economy as well as the income flows it receives from it, while large domestic financial capitalists also increased their profits following the crisis. Second, industrial capital benefited via a reduction of real wages and a decline in the strength of the labor movement. Third, the structural changes imposed on the economy in the aftermath of the crisis, in order to 'remedy' to the situation, furthered the interests of capital in general by promoting increased privatization and changes in public finances, including most notably an increase in regressive taxation. Furthermore, policies associated with neoliberalism, such as central bank independence, labor flexibility, the liberalization of agriculture, and so on, have been extended and deepened in the economy.
Our findings provide empirical support to the contention that financial crises could be supportive of the current capitalist order, notably the international financial system and large financial capitalists. We deem this to be important insofar as it suggests that financial crises not only stunt the economic development of the countries they beset, but they could also both slant that development in favor of capital and deprive the government of these countries of some of their autonomy. Of course, far;reaching inferences cannot be drawn from the study of only one country and other financial crises should be analyzed before any general conclusion is reached (see, for example, Dufour & Orhangazi, 2007) .
However, our analysis raises an interesting point. In Marxian crisis theory, the capitalist system is inherently unstable and prone to crisis. Although there are various explanations regarding the reasons behind these crises, the Marxian approach usually sees a crisis as setting up the next expansion by bringing wages and interest rates down, devaluing capital and preparing the ground for organizational and institutional change. Hence crises automatically play the role of "the irrational rationalizer of the economic system" (Harvey 1999: 305 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 3 Government finances appeared to have been on an unsustainable path throughout the 1990s as interest payments required increased borrowing. However, in terms of its level, the public debt was not that high at the beginning of the stabilization program. The public debt stood at 36.3 percent of GNP (IMF, 1998) at the outset of the program (42.9 percent of GDP at the end of 1997 according to Akyüz & Boratav, 2003) , which is around the OECD average (e.g. 47 percent in 1997 and 46.6 percent in 2004) (OECD, 2004) . Moreover, the correlation between the debt (or deficit) and the inflation rate in Turkey in the 1990s is not that clear cut (Akyüz & Boratav, 2003, especially Table 1 ), the assertion made in support of the program's objectives notwithstanding. In this context, it is interesting to see the initial stress put around debt reduction, especially in light of the relaxation of this concern later on when the financial crisis erupts in Turkey. 4 The SDIF, which was formed under the Central Bank to provide deposit insurance in 1983, was put under the authority of Banking Supervision and Regulation Authority in 1999.
43 5 We include the debt of both the Central Bank and the consolidated public sector in our measure of public debt. 6 The ratio of interest payment to total tax revenues had been on an upward trend throughout most of the nineties, starting right before the 1994 financial crisis, and 8 See Desai, Foley & Forbes (2004) for a detailed layout of this argument. 9 The level of FDI was still relatively low after the crisis, especially if we compare it to countries which have a longer history of foreign investment, such as Mexico (The Economist, 2005) . However, what is important is that this level of FDI was quite extraordinary for Turkey, which is what we believe should be the point of reference, given that a host of other factors specific to Turkey determine the level of investment in that country. What is also striking is that although the capital account had technically been completely deregulated in 1989, FDI only picks up after the 2000;2001 crisis, more than a decade later.
10 In other words, although the deal was struck in 2000, the bulk of the payments were made in 2001. We thank Erdal Yılmaz from the CBRT for pointing this out.
